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The Jury's Political Role:
"To See With Their Own Eyes"
Valerie P. Hans
O n May 17, 1985, a jury acquitted
eight anti-apartheid demonstrators
charged with trespassing at the South
African Consulate in Chicago. Defense
attorneys presented the defense of neces-
sity to the jury, arguing that the activists'
conduct was necessary to avoid greater
public injury from the apartheid poli-
cies of the South African government.
According to one juror's report, the jury
was split initially. But after jurors read
the Illinois statute that excuses some
criminal conduct by reason of necessity,
they concluded that "the defendants
had to do what they did." As one
defendant rejoiced after the jury verdict,
"A jury of our peers acquitted us but
indicted the government of South
Africa."1
In Toronto, Dr. Henry Morgenthaler
was also acquitted by a jury of his peers
last November on charges that he vio-
lated Canadian laws regulating abor-
tions. Since 1967, the laws of Canada
have permitted abortions if continua-
tion of pregnancy poses risks to a wom-
an's life or health. But the law also
requires a cumbersome and time-con-
suming review of each request for an
abortion by specially selected boards of
accredited hospitals. Furthermore, citi-
zens opposed to abortion rights have
taken control of some review boards,
with the result that, in certain hospitals,
no abortion requests have been granted
for years. To alleviate what he saw as a
pressing social problem, Dr. Morgen-
thaler opened abortion clinics, first in
Montreal and later in Toronto and Win-
nipeg. His actions were in clear viola-
tion of Canadian law. Yet in four separ-
ate trials, juries acquitted the doctor of
wrongdoing.2
It is doubtful whether the judges sit-
ting in these cases would have reached
the same verdict. Nevertheless, were
the decisions fair and just? Was it appro-
priate for jurors in the antiapartheid
case to interpret the defense of neces-
sity generously? Was justice done when
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Morgentnaler juries ignored the law
entirely? An observer's assessment may
depend on whether he opposes apar-
theid or supports abortion rights.
Indeed, these jury decisions may be
due in large measure to the fact that the
majority of citizens both oppose racial
discrimination and support abortion.
But a larger question is at stake here.
Under what circumstances, if any, is it
right for juries to ignore the dictates of
law in arriving at their verdicts?
The political role of the jury has come
into the spotlight recently, not only in
these two cases but also in the trials of
members of the religiously based sanc-
tuary movement and the Ponting case
in England. Legal scholars have labelled
as "jury nullification" the refusal of jur-
ies to apply the law when they believe
that to follow the letter of the law would
result in injustice. Jury nullification is
actually a form of jury equity, the prac-
tice of deciding cases in line with com-
munity notions of justice and fairness.
Jury nullification may constitute a strong
repudiation of the law, as in the Mor-
genthaler case, or may be present in a
weaker version, when juries take a mer-
ciful view of the facts or interpret the
law generously, as in the anti-apartheid
case.
Most people feel at least somewhat
uneasy about giving any decision-
making group in society the prerogative
to disregard the law. However, the great
legal scholar Wigmore maintained that
precisely this power of juries is essential
in assuring justice. He noted that law
and justice are on occasion inevitably in
conflict. While law is a general rule,
justice is the fairness of the outcome in
a particular case considering all the cir-
cumstances. Because lawmakers cannot
anticipate every set of circumstances, it
is up to the jury to adjust the general
rule of law to the justice of the specific
case.
Many features of the jury allow jurors
to reach decisions that are contrary to
the law. First, jurors deliberate in secret.
Unless jurors themselves talk, no one
will know about the content of their
deliberation or the reasons underlying
their decision. They deliver their verdict
as a group. Thus no one individual is
accountable for the decision. Unlike
judges, juries need give no rationale for
their verdict, and the decision they
reach is not binding upon future cases.
Finally, in cases of acquittal, there is no
opportunity for appellate review of the
jury decision. Thus the very structure of
jury decision- making permits the jury to
be absolutely unaccountable for show-
ing mercy to defendants.
Juries did not always enjoy this verit-
able lack of accountability. In Great Bri-
tain, Bushell's Case, decided in 1670,
established the principle that jurors
could not be punished for deciding a
verdict contrary to the evidence or the
wishes of the Court. The case arose
from the trial of the two Quakers, Wil-
liam Penn and William Mead, who were
charged with preaching to an unlawful
assembly. The motivation behind the
charges was to harass members of the
fledgling Quaker movement. Jurors re-
peatedly refused to convict the two
defendants, despite considerable pres-
sure from the judge. As a result the
twelve jurors found themselves jailed
along with the defendants! The jurors
were eventually released, and a suit by
one of the jurors, Edward Bushell, laid
the foundations for jurors' freedom
from culpability for their verdicts.
In England, there were numerous
instances in which juries exercised their
political power. For instance, in the
19th century, there were over 200
offenses that were punishable by death.
Many of these crimes were minor and a
number involved political dissent. Jur-
ies often acquitted rather than send a
defendant to death for such offenses.
Indeed, in 1819, English bankers re-
quested that the death penalty for for-
gery be eliminated, since juries simply
Many features of the jury allow jurors to reach
decisions that are contrary to the law. Thus the very
structure of jury decision-making permits the jury to be
absolutely unaccountable for showing mercy to
defendants.
would not convict forgers when the
death penalty was the mandatory result
of conviction. Historians maintain that
this reluctance of juries to convict led to
the decline of capital punishment in
England.
Opposition to English laws also fig-
ured in the most famous case of jury
nullification on this side of the Atlantic.
In 1735, John Peter Zenger, publisher of
the New York Weekly Journal, ran arti-
cles highly critical of the New York gov-
ernor, a British appointee. The gover-
nor was very unpopular with colonists.
Nevertheless it was a crime at that time
to publish any article, whether true or
false, that was critical of the govern-
ment. Zenger stood trial on charges of
seditious libel. According to existing
libel law, the jury was to decide only
whether Zenger had published the crit-
ical articles, while the judge was to
decide whether the articles were actu-
ally libelous. In an eloquent defense for
Zenger, the attorney Andrew Hamilton
argued that these laws of libel on the
books were wrong and usurped the
rightful function and power of the jury.
He attempted to persuade the jury that
its duty was to acquit Zenger rather than
follow unfair laws: "Jurymen are to see
with their own eyes, to hear with their
own ears, and to make use of their own
consciences and understandings, in
judging of the lives, liberties or estates
of their fellow subjects." The jury appar-
ently agreed with Hamilton and delib-
erated only a few minutes before acquit-
ting Zenger of libel.3
The jury proved to be an important
tool for abolitionists before the Civil
War. The Fugitive Slave Laws enacted in
1850 outlawed helping slaves escape or
impeding their capture and return.
Northern juries frequently acquitted
abolitionists who had assisted slaves
even though the facts in the cases
clearly indicated guilt.
These historical cases are often used
to praise the wisdom of our system of
jury trial. Yet over the nineteenth cen-
tury, respect and trust in the jury began
to wane, and events occurred that in-
creasingly restricted the jury's power. As
more judges were legally trained, their
role expanded from that of mere pre-
siders over the proceedings to key
interpreters of law for lay jurors. Al-
though it was widespread practice to
allow juries to decide the law as well as
the facts in the early days of this country,
the jury's right to do so was limited
toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In Sparf and Hansen v. United
States, 156 U.S.51 (1896), the United
States Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two
vote, curtailed the right of juries to
deliver a merciful verdict that was at
odds with the evidence. In Sparf, two
sailors were charged with murder for
throwing a fellow sailor overboard. The
defendants argued that they should be
found guilty only of manslaughter, and
asked the judge to instruct the jurors
that they could render a verdict either of
murder or manslaughter. The judge
refused on the grounds that there was
no evidence to support a manslaughter
verdict. The judge instructed the jury:
"In a proper case, a verdict for mans-
laughter may be rendered,... and even
in this case you have the physical power
to do so; but as one of the tribunals of
this country, a jury is expected to be
governed by law, and the law it should
receive from the court." 156 U.S. at p. 62.
The defendants were convicted, but
appealed on grounds that the jury had
been improperly instructed. The Sup-
reme Court rejected the appeal and
stated that juries should not be permit-
ted to reduce penalties or nullify laws,
since they were likewise unable to
increase penalties or create new laws.
Jury nullification surfaced as an issue
more recently at the time of the Vietnam
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War. There was widespread opposition
to American involvement in Southeast
Asia, and many Americans engaged in
acts of civil disobedience to express
their outrage and to call attention to
moral issues regarding the Vietnam
War. As these defendants came to trial,
their attorneys often attempted to argue
that the defendants' behavior was justi-
fied on the basis of the questionable
legality and morality of the war. But
judges characteristically ruled that the
defendants' motivation was irrelevant.
Few judges allowed defense attorneys
to tell the jury about its historic power
to nullify the law by acquitting the
defendants. The trial of Benjamin Spock
and several others on charges that they
conspired to encourage young men to
bum their draft cards was typical. Accord-
ing to one account, jurors in that case
were sympathetic to Spock and his
codefendants. But in his charge to the
jurors, the judge told them that they
must use the law that he gave to them
and not their own views of the law. The
jury convicted Spock and several of his
codefendants, apparently with some
anguish. The following comments from
some of the Spock jurors interviewed by
Jessica Mitford are instructive:
Of course you wonder if you made the
right decision; but the way the judge
charged us, there was no choice. People
I've talked with since the verdict are
sympathetic to the actions of Spock and
Coffin—they seem to think the jury
should have been there to decide if the
law is right or wrong but we weren't
there to decide that. You can't have jur-
ies deciding whether laws are right—
there are certain laws on the books.4
I'm in agreement with what they're try-
ing to accomplish—my friends were
amazed I found them guilty; but they
did break the law... I don't have to stress
where my sympathy lay. Like Raskin, I
think it's a senseless war. But my per-
sonal views don't count. . . I'm con-
vinced the Vietnam war is no good. But
we've got a Constitution to uphold. If we
allow people to break the law, we're akin
to anarchy.5
The dilemma of the jurors was acute:
How could they simultaneously uphold
the rule of law and achieve justice in
the Spock case? The power of the judge
in leading the jurors to follow the rule
of law and to ignore their personal sen-
timents is apparent in the following
Spock juror's comment:
/ knew they were guilty when we were
charged by the judge. I did not know
prior to that time—/ was in full agree-
ment with the defendants until we were
charged by the judge. That was the kiss
of death?
Since Sparf the Supreme Court has
not directly discussed the propriety of
jury nullification. However, perusal of
Supreme Court opinions on the func-
tion of the jury over the last two decades
reveals dicta indicating that the Court
sees the jury's chief function as political.
In Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), the
Court stated that the "right to jury trial is
granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent oppression by the Govern-
ment."7 In Taylor v. Louisiana (1975),
the Court described the jury's purpose:
"to guard against the exercise of arbi-
trary power—to make available the com-
mon sense judgement of the commun-
ity as a hedge against the overzealous
prosecutor and in preference to the pro-
fessional or perhaps overconditioned
or biased response of a judge."8 Finally,
in a long line of decisions, the Court has
consistently maintained that the jury
cannot be the "organ of a special class"
but must fairly represent the entire
community. I interpret these decisions
to mean that the Courts supports the
infusion of community sentiment in
jury verdias, and would sanrtion, under
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certain circumstances, jury verdicts at
odds with unfair laws or oppressive
prosecutorial practices.
Whatever the Supreme Court has had
to say about jury lawlessness, systematic
research has shown that juries some-
time bend the Jaw to reflect community
notions of justice. In their landmark
book, The American Jury, Harry Kalven
and Hans Zeisel asked judges presiding
over jury trials to report the jury's verdict
in a specific case and compare it with
the verdict the judge would have reach-
ed had the case been tried by judge
alone. In 78% of the trials, judge and
jury would have reached the same ver-
dict. However, in the remaining 22% of
cases, the jury's sense of justice led it to
a different verdict. Interestingly, these
disagreements occurred almost always
when the evidence in the case was
close, suggesting that jurors bend the
law or facts rather than ignore them
entirely. The explanations for the dis-
agreements constituted something of a
casebook of jury law. For instance, jur-
ies had an expanded view of permissi-
ble self-defense that went beyond the
bounds prescribed by law. Jurors some-
time excused defendants if their victims
played a contributory role. They acquit-
ted some defendants if the offense was
a minimal one or the harm done was
trivial. Juries also showed reluctance to
convict defendants charged with un-
popular laws such as game and liquor
violations.9 Subsequent research has
confirmed that while the strength of
evidence is the prime determinant of
jury verdicts, jurors do take into account
their own views of justice in specific
cases.10
Some legal scholars, recognizing the
important political role of the jury, have
advocated instructing jurors about their
right to deviate from the law if it is
required to achieve justice.11 According
to the results of one survey, there might
be strong public support for such in-
structions. A 1977 survey asked Canadi-
ans the following question:
Do you think that jurors in all crimi-
nal cases should be instructed that
"it is difficult to write laws that are
just for all conceivable circumstan-
ces. Therefore, you are entitled to
followyour own conscience instead
of strictly applying the law if it is
necessary to do so to reach a just
result?"
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Canadians overwhelmingly support-
ed this instruction, with 76.4% respond-
ing that it should definitely or probably
be given, and only 15.4% stating that it
should not be given to jurors in criminal
cases. Furthermore, those Canadians
who had served on a jury were even
more supportive. Fully 92.6% of re-
spondents with previous jury service
thought the instruction should be given,
compared to 75.4% supported from
those without prior jury service. Cana-
dians, then, appear to want the jury to
have some flexibility in applying the
letter of the law.
The results from a survey of Canadian
judges stand in sharp contrast to this
public support. Judges who had juris-
diction to hear criminal jury trials were
asked whether they felt that jurors
should be given the equity instruction.
The answer was a resounding no: Just
4.5% of judges agreed that jurors should
be so instructed.12
What would happen if juries were
given such instructions? Would there be
chaos in the courts with juries routinely
ignoring the law? Would prejudice play
an even greater role in jury verdicts?The
experiences of Delaware's neighboring
state of Maryland give us some insights
into how such an instruction might
work. In most states, juries decide ques-
tions of fact while the interpretation of
the law is left to the judge. But in two
states, Maryland and Indiana, juries have
the constitutional authority to judge
both the facts and the law. In line with
the Maryland Rules of Procedure, the
standard judge's instruction to the jury
is as follows: "Anything which I say
about the law, including any instruc-
tions which I may give you, is merely
advisory and you are not in any way
bound by it. You may feel free to reject
my advice on the law and to arrive at
your own independent conclusion."
Because juries and not judges are the
final arbiters of the law, counsel may
argue differing interpretations of the
law to the jury. Political scientist Gary
Jacobsohn surveyed Maryland judges
about their views of this jury instruction.
Overall, the judges felt that the law had
minimal impact, but they believed that
when it affected a case it benefited the
defendant. Despite the instruction, the
Maryland trial judges retained consid-
erable power over the jury. One judge,
for instance, mentioned,' 'When the jury
is told that they are judges of the law, I
doubt that they have any grasp of what is
meant." The degree to which the judges
emphasized the jury's right to decide
the law varied from courtroom to court-
room and was related to the judges'
attitudes toward the jury and the propri-
ety of jury nullification.13
Psychologist Irwin Horowitz has also
collected some data that suggest the
likely impact of jury instructions about
its political role. He used the method of
jury simulation to explore the effect of
jury instructions about nullification. In
his research, he asked whether the jury
functions differently if it is given nullifi-
cation instructions, whether the impact
of such instructions depends on the
precise form in which they are given,
and whether their impact also depends
on the type of case in which they are
given. His answer was yes to all three
questions. Ohio jurors who had already
served as real jurors listened to a murder
case, a drunk driving case, or a case
involving euthanasia. The simulated
jurors received either standard Ohio
pattern instructions, Maryland pattern
instructions, or "radical nullification"
instructions, which described the jury's
historic power to ignore the law and
decide cases in line with community
sentiment. The instructions made no
difference whatsoever in the murder
case. However, in the other two cases,
the radical nullification instructions af-
fected the simulated juries' decisions.
Juries were more likely to convict the
drunk drivers and to acquit the eutha-
nasia defendant. Furthermore, when
jurors received radical nullification instruc-
tions they were more likely in group
deliberations to discuss the instructions
and their personal views and experien-
ces and less likely to discuss the evi-
dence. Juries receiving the Maryland
pattern instructions behaved no differ-
ently from juries with standard instruc-
tions. It may be that jurors did not really
understand the instructions, or that the
Maryland instructions affect jury deci-
sion making only when attorneys argue
differing interpretations of law (which
they did not do in the jury simulations).14
Whether juries should be encour-
aged or discouraged from exercising
their political role is a profoundly diffi-
cult question to answer. On the one
hand, I worry that such instructions
would increase the strength of many
unfavorable sentiments. For instance,
would black defendants be more likely
to be convicted by prejudiced juries?
Would prejudicial pretrial publicity have
even greater impact on jury verdicts? On
the other hand, on the basis of my own
and other research on the jury, I have
great respect for it as an institution. In
most instances, juries appear to reach
fair and just decisions. By refusing to
allow the jury to hear information about
its power to adapt the law to specific
cases, we may be usurping the rightful
function of the jury and undermining its
original political purpose. Indeed, we
are left with something of a paradox. We
expect the jury to follow the law. Yet we
also expect jurors "to see with their own
eyes" and to ignore the law on occa-
sion. This tension between following
the rule of law and making exceptions
to the law is an ineluctable pan of the
institution of the jury.
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